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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
A CLASH BETWEEN IMPEACHING THE ACCUSED'S TESTIMONY
AND PROTECTING HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Oregon v. Hass, 95 S. Ct. 1215 (1975)
Defendant was arrested for the theft of two bicycles and was given his
Mirandawarnings.' While being taken to the site of the theft, defendant asked
to telephone his attorney. The arresting officer told defendant he could do so
2
when they arrived at the police station, but then continued to question him.
Incriminating responses to these questions were admitted at trial for the purpose of impeaching defendant's testimony. 3 The jury found defendant guilty of
first degree burglary, but the Oregon court of appeals reversed on the ground
that the responses should not have been admitted. 4 The state supreme court
agreed, ruling that total exclusion was necessary to insure police compliance
with the accused's right to an attorney.6 On certiorari the Supreme Court reversed and HELD, uncoerced, inculpatory statements obtained from a defendant in violation of his Miranda rights can be used to impeach his testimony, provided the evidence satisfies legal standards of reliability.7
1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966). "[W]e hold that when an individual
is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way... [h]e must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain
silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right
to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires."
2. This was in violation of the Miranda decision, which states that when a defendant
requests a lawyer, all questioning must stop until an attorney is present. 384 U.S. at 474.
3. Upon continued questioning, the defendant identified the two houses from which the
bicycles were stolen. At trial, defendant took the stand and admitted having participated in
an attempt to conceal the bicycles, but he claimed that he had no prior knowledge of the
burglaries. He said that he did not know from what homes the bicycles had been taken by
his friends who had been riding with the defendant. Oregon v. Hass, 95 S. Ct. 1215, 1218
(1975).
4. State v. Haas, 13 Ore. App. 368, 510 P.2d 852 (1973). (An alias, Haas, was used to
designate the defendant in the state courts.) This court based its decision on State v. Brewton, 247 Ore. 241, 422 P.2d 581 (1967). In Brewton, the court rejected impeaching a defendant's testimony by the use of statements obtained when no Miranda warnings were given.
Arguing that the defendant's constitutional rights would be empty promises if the exclusionary rule were limited, the court stated: "As commendable as it may be to prevent perjury, the
price of such prevention could be to keep defendants off the stand entirely ....
[I]f the choice
is to exclude all illegally obtained evidence or to silence the defendant as a witness, it is
better to exclude the illegal evidence." Id. at 245-46, 422 P.2d at 583.
5. State v. Haas, 267 Ore. 489, 517 P.2d 671 (1973).
6. 419 U.S. 823 (1974).
7. 95 S. Ct. 1215 (1975). The Court stated that it granted certiorari because the Oregon
decision was in conflict with Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), see text accompanying
notes 24-25 infra, and State v. Bryant, 280 N.C. 551, 187 S.E.2d 111, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 995
(1972). See 95 S. Ct. at 1219. In Bryant, statements made by defendant to the police were admitted to impeach defendant's testimony. Bryant was given his Miranda warnings, but had
not waived his right to counsel. There was no evidence that he had requested an attorney.
The North Carolina court upheld the impeachment of defendant's testimony solely on the
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The law of confessions attempts to secure reliable evidence without sacrificing individual rights.8 The traditional test for the admissibility of confessions
has been whether the confession was voluntary and trustworthy. 9 As the Supreme Court became more concerned with insulating the accused from abusive

police practices, procedural guidelines were imposed on police interrogation of
a defendant.1° One such safeguard was the expansion of the accused's right to
counsel. In 1963 the Supreme Court held, in Gideon v. Wainwright," that a
defendant in a felony prosecution was entitled to an attorney, even if he could
not afford one.1 2 A year after Gideon, the Court reaffirmed earlier dicta 3 to
the effect that an indicted defendant under police interrogation has the right
to counsel.14 That same year, in Escobedo v. Illinois,15 the limitation that the
suspect be indicted was dropped; instead, the Court ruled that the right to
counsel attached whenever the police investigation has focused on a suspect and
the police seek to interrogate that person while in custody. The Escobedo

Court attempted to insure compliance by applying the exclusionary rule' 6 to
statements elicited by the police in violation of the accused's right to counsel.17
To provide more concrete guidelines, Miranda v. Arizona, s set down four
warnings 9 to be given an accused before any questioning begins. This decision
was based on the fifth amendment privilege that no person could be compelled
to incriminate himself. 20 The Court applied the exclusionary rule to all state-

basis of Harris. Justices Douglas and Brennan dissented from the denial of certiorari in
Bryant because they felt that Bryant went beyond the scope of the Harris decision and
further compromised constitutionally guaranteed rights. 409 U.S. at 995-97.
8. See Developments in the Law - Confessions, 79 HARV. L. Rav. 935, 964 (1966).
9. See Cangi, Confessions: Historical Perspective and a Proposal, 10 HousTON L. REv.
1087, 1088 (1973).
10. Id.
11. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
12. Id. at 341-45. The Court looked to the sixth amendment, which provides: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), the Court
had construed this amendment to require appointment of counsel in all federal cases where a
defendant could not afford an attorney. The Court in Gideon applied the sixth amendment
to the states through the fourteenth amendment, holding that defendants in a felony
prosecution were entitled to a lawyer. 372 U.S. at 342. Subsequently, the Court decided that
an accused, whether charged with a misdemeanor or felony, could not be imprisoned unless
he was represented by counsel. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
13. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 325 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring). "Depriving a
person, formally charged with a crime, of counsel during the period prior to trial may be
more damaging than denial of counsel during the trial itself." Id.
14. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
15. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
16. The exclusionary rule was first used to protect a defendant's fourth amendment right
to be free from unreasonable search and seizure by barring the use of such evidence in federal criminal proceedings. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). In Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961), the Court extended the exclusionary rule to state criminal trials.
17. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964).
18. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
19. See note 1 supra.
20. 384 U.S. at 467-68.
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ments elicited when no Miranda warnings were given. 21 There was still soml
question, however, whether these statements were to be totally excluded froan
trial,2 2 or whether the statements could be used to impeach a defendant's credi
bility.23

Five years after Miranda, this issue was resolved in Harris v. New York.2 1

In Harris,the Court approved the impeachment of defendant's trial testimony
by the use of incriminating statements that had been obtained from the defendant without advising him of his right to counsel. The majority emphasized
that the shield of Miranda "cannot be perverted into a license" to commit
perjury.2 5 The Court in Harrisbased its decision on Walder v. United States.281
The Walder case involved a defendant charged with selling drugs who testified
that he had never possessed any narcotics. The trial court allowed the introduction of evidence which showed that heroin had been illegally seized from the
defendant in a previous arrest two years earlier. Reviewing the trial court's
ruling, the Supreme Court affirmed the impeachment of defendant's credibility
through the use of this tainted evidence. 27 Although the dissent in Harris
argued that Walder only allowed impeachment of the accused's testimony on
"matters collateral to the crime charged,"28 Chief Justice Burger's majority
21. Id. at 479.
22. The following language from Miranda indicates this may have been the intent of the
Court: "The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from being compelled
to incriminate himself in any manner; it does not distinguish degrees of incrimination....
In fact, statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in the statements given under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication. These statements are incriminating in any
meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without the full warnings and effective
waiver required for any other statement." 384 U.S. at 476-77. See also Kent, Harris v. New
York: The Death Knell of Miranda and Walder, 38 BROOKLYN L. Rxv. 357 (1971). Six federal
circuit courts and fourteen state appellate courts had concluded after Miranda that illegally
obtained statements could not be used to impeach a defendant's testimony. See Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222, 281 n.4 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
23. See State v. Kimbrough, 109 N.J. Super. 57, 262 A.2d 232 (1970); State v. Butler, 19
Ohio St. 2d 55, 249 N.E.2d 818 (1969); State v. Grant, 77 Wash. 2d 47, 459 P.2d 689 (1969);
Cole, Impeachment with Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence: Coming to Grips with the
PerjurousDefendant, 62 J. CalM. L.C. & P.S. 1 (1971) (arguing that the Court should rule in
favor of allowing a defendant's testimony to be impeached by the use of illegally obtained

statements).
24. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). This was a 5-4 decision with Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan,
and Marshall dissenting.
25. Id. at 226.

26. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
27. Id. at 65.
28. 401 U.S. at 227. The dissent also quoted the following language from Walder which
seems inconsistent with how the Harris majority interpreted that decision: "Of course, the
constitution guarantees a defendant the fullest opportunity to meet the accusations against
him. He must be free to deny all the elements of the case against him without thereby giving
leave to the Government to introduce by way of rebuttal evidence illegally secured by it, and
therefore not available for its case in chief." 347 U.S. at 65. For a discussion of the quote and
how the Harris majority ignored this important distinction, see Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v.
New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon
Majority, 80 YmAx LJ. 1198, 1217-18 (1971).
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opinion concluded that this difference did not justify reaching a different result from Walder.29 The Court also reasoned that the deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule was not sacrificed since police abuse would be "sufficiently"
deterred by continuing to exclude the tainted statements from the prosecution's case in chief.3S
The instant case 31 is the Court's first attempt to define the scope of the
Harrisdecision.3 2 The majority viewed the principal case as little more than
29. 401 U.S. at 225. This reasoning of the Harris majority overlooks the "considerable
risk that illegally obtained evidence which bears directly on the crime charged will be considered by the jury as direct evidence of the defendant's guilt. This risk is significantly reduced when the illegally obtained evidence does not directly relate to the elements of the
crime charged," as was the case in Walder. Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 28, at 1215-17. This
risk of prejudice to the defendant is not likely to be cured by an instruction to the jury
admonishing them to consider the illegal evidence only when assessing the defendant's
credibility. Can the jury "cleanse their minds" of the contents of incriminating statments
when they deliberate on the guilt or innocence of the defendant? Id. Chief Justice Burger,
however, did not explain why a different result was not warranted. His opinion merely referred to the benefits of the impeachment process, such as the valuable aid to the jury in
assessing a defendant's credibility, and concluded that these benefits should "not be lost." 401
U.S. at 225.
30. 401 U.S. at 225. A number of scholars have disagreed and argued that the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule was "lessened, if not eliminated" by the Harris decision.
Dershowitz & Ely, supra note 28, at 1218-21; Note, Statements Admissible to Impeach Defendant Even Though Miranda Warnings Were Not Given, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 394, 399
(1971); Note, "Trustworthy" Self-Incriminating Evidence Not Otherwise Admissible Under
Miranda v. Arizona Is Admissible To Impeach an Accused's Trial Testimony, 49 TExAs L.
REv. 1119, 1127 (1971); Comment, Statements Obtained in Violation of Miranda Guidelines
May Be Used To Impeach Testifying Defendant's Credibility, 24 VAND. L. REv. 843, 850 (1971).
31. This was a 6-2 decision with Justice Douglas taking no part in consideration of the
case.
32. Other issues have arisen over the interpretation of Harris. One question is whether
Harris is limited to impeaching a defendant's direct testimony and therefore does not allow
the prosecution to impeach the defendant's statements made on cross-examination. See People
v. Taylor, 8 Cal. 3d 174, 501 P.2d 918, 104 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 863
(1973). Another issue is whether defendant's silence with the police can be used to impeach
him when he takes the stand and gives an explanation of the event. See, e.g., United States v.
Ramirez, 441 F.2d 950 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971) (court held that impeachment extends to prior inconsistent silence). Contra, e.g., Johnson v. Patterson, 475 F.2d 1066
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973) (court held that silence was an exercise of a
constitutional right). The Supreme Court, which recently considered this issue in a case arising in a lower federal court, concluded that a defendant's silence was "so ambiguous" as to
have "little probative force." Thus, defendant's pre-trial silence was inadmissible in this case.
The Court did not find it necessary to reach the constitutional issue of whether this result
was compelled by the fifth amendment. United States v. Hale, 95 S. Ct. 2133 (1975).
Other decisions have sought to limit or restrict the Harris opinion. See Howard v. Craven,
446 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1971) (illegal evidence must be admitted to rebut a specific false statement, and not just to discredit the defendant's character); See, e.g., Alesi v. Craven, 440 F.2d
975 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 856 (1971) (error in a state proceeding which impeached
a defendant's testimony by the use of involuntary statements; the Harris decision did not
change the exclusion of involuntary or coerced confessions); State v. Kassow, 28 Ohio St. 2d
141, 277 N.E.2d 435, 440 (1971) (for a statement to be used for impeachment, it must be determined that there was no "abuse, threat or reward compelling the statement itself"); Commonwealth v. Woods, 455 Pa. 1, 312 A.2d 357 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 880 (1974) (the
prosecution can not impeach a defendant's testimony when this testimony completely agrees
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an extension of Harris to a situation involving a different violation of Miranda;33 this position, however, overlooks a crucial difference in the arresting
officer's conduct in the two cases. In Harris, the police officer inadvertently
failed to include a warning to defendant that he had the right to counsel; 34 in
the instant case, the policeman willfully violated the Miranda guideline that
questioning must stop after the defendant requests an attorney. 35 Also these
situations may have drastically different effects on defendant's constitutional
protections. Failure to inform the defendant of his right to counsel arguably
may reduce the likelihood that defendant will invoke the right, but giving the
defendant his complete warnings is useless if he is thereafter consciously denied
the opportunity to exercise those privileges.
The Court emphasized that the criminal trial is a search for the truth,s 6
and stressed that the impeachment process aids in this function.3 7 The instant
case recalled the Harris concern that the fifth amendment privilege not be extended so as to give the defendant a constitutional right to commit perjury.38
Finally, the majority noted that any police abuse "may be taken care of when
it arises measured by the traditional standards for evaluating voluntariness and
trustworthiness."3 9 The Court found no need to apply these standards to the
present case since there was no evidence that defendant's remarks were coerced
or involuntary.40
with the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses); Upchurch v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 553, 219
N.W.2d 363 (1974) (inculpatory statements made by the defendant must be trustworthy to
be used as impeachment evidence). But see United States v. Hodge, 487 F.2d 945 (5th Cir.
1973) (the defendant does not have to perjure himself; once the defendant has admitted making prior inconsistent statements, these statements are admissible for impeachment purposes).
33. Before this, one federal court and two state appellate courts held on fact situations
close to Hass that Harris v. New York was controlling. See United States ex rel. Wright v.
LaVallee, 471 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973) (defendant testified
that he had requested an attorney, but the state court made no finding on the issue); Colbert
v. State, 124 Ga. App. 283, 183 S.E.2d 476 (1971) (defendant claimed to have requested an
attorney); Davis v. State, 257 Ind. 46, 271 N.E.2d 893 (1971) (defendant was willing to talk,
but wanted to contact his attorney). But see State v. Joseph, 10 Wash. App. 827, 520 P.2d 635
(1974) (defendant claimed that he had requested a lawyer, but that the custodial interrogation continued for over an hour. The court remanded for a determination of whether the
statements were voluntarily made and seemed to indicate that if the denial of an attorney
were proven, the statements would be involuntary).
34. 401 U.S. at 224. There is some evidence that the defendant in Harris may also have
requested an attorney, but this was not mentioned in the Court's opinion. See Dershowitz &
Ely, supranote 28, at 1200.
35. 95 S. Ct. at 1217. Questioning was to stop in order to give meaning to defendant's
right to consult a lawyer and to have him present during the questioning. See Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966).
36. Oregon v. Hass, 95 S. Ct. 1215, 1221 (1975).
37. Id. at 1220.
38. Id. at 1221.
39. Id. The Miranda court rejected the voluntariness test as unsatisfactory because of the
difficulty in ascertaining all the subtle factors of coercion created by the "incommunicado
interrogation of individuals in a police dominated atmosphere." 384 U.S. at 445.
40. 95 S. Ct. at 1221. "There is no evidence or suggestion that Hass's statements to Officer Osterholme . . . were involuntary or coerced. He properly sensed, to be'sure that he
was in 'trouble'; but the pressure on him was no greater than that on any person in like
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Writing in dissent,4' justice Brennan worried that the instant decision
weakened the accused's right to counsel4- He argued that there was no incentive 43 for the police to stop the interrogation of the accused when he requests the assistance of counsel. 44 If the questioning is continued, the police
may acquire incriminating statements which can be used to impeach the defendant who chooses to testify. 45 If Miranda is followed, the defendant is likely

to remain silent on the advice of his attorney. Consequently, the dissent concluded that "police interrogation will doubtless now be vigorously pressed to
obtain statements before the attorney arrives."46 Furthermore, Justice Brennan
reiterated the two arguments he advanced in Harris as also applicable to the
instant case. First, despite the niceties of distinction, incriminating statements
prove guilt whether used as direct evidence or to impeach a defendant's credibility47 Second, giving weight to tainted evidence sanctions and legitimates il48
legal conduct undertaken by the government itself.

The present case reflects the inherent tension persisting in the principle that
the criminal trial should be a search for the truth pursued within the framework of the constitutional rights of the accused. If the pursuit of truth is the
custody or under inquiry by an investigating officer." Id. This statement conflicts with the
Miranda decision, wherein the Court was concerned not only with physical coercion, but also
with the psychological pressure placed on a defendant in custody. The Miranda Court noted:
"It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created for no other purpose than to
subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. . . . To be sure, this is not physical
intimidation, but it is equally destructive of human dignity." 384 U.S. at 457. The Miranda
Court found that this psychological pressure violated the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. However, the Hass decision ignores psychological coercion altogether.
41. Justice Marshall concurred in Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion and wrote a
separate dissenting opinion in which he criticized the majority for deciding the merits. He
noted that it was not clear whether the Oregon supreme court had decided the case on an
interpretation of the Federal Constitution or on an interpretation of its own state constitution. He concluded that the case should be remanded to the Oregon supreme court for
clarification of its decision. 95 S. Ct. at 1222-24. Two state appellate courts have rejected the
Harris result on state statutory or constitutional grounds. See State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii
254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971); Butler v. State, 493 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
42. 95 S.Ct. at 1222.
43. The majority opinion in Hass admitted that "the officer may be said to have little to
lose and perhaps something to gain by the way of possibly uncovering impeachment material."
95 S. Ct. at 1221. However, Justice Blackmun stated that this was only a "speculative possibility" and that "in any event, the balance was struck in Harris." Id.
44. See note 35 supra.
45. In a footnote to his dissent, Justice Brennan pointed out that a defendant is denied
his unfettered choice of whether to testify by the Court's decision in Hass and in Harris. 95
S. Ct. at 1222 n.2. See note 4 supra. See also Comment, Statements Inadmissible Against a
Defendant as Substantive Evidence May Be Used To Impeach Credibility of Defendant's Trial
Testimony, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1241, 1246 (1971).
46. 95 S.Ct. at 1222.
47. Id. See note 29 supra.
48. This is the normative justification for the exclusionary rule. See Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting): "If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of criminal law the end justifies the
means - to declare that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction
of a private criminal - would bring terrible retribution."
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major goal, the defendant's statements in the instant case should certainly be
admissible at trial if they are reliable evidence. If constitutional rights are
paramount, then the incriminating statements should be excluded in order to
protect the accused's right to a lawyer and his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. The instant case strikes a balance in favor of society's interest in arriving at the truth and convicting the guilty.49 This is a
swing away from a series of cases, beginning with Gideon and culminating in
Miranda, in which the Court felt that the more important value was the
preservation of the fundamental rights of the defendant.50
The instant case also departs from the concrete and precise procedural
guidelines, enunciated in Miranda, for protecting the accused from police
abuse.5 ' Uncomfortable with these inflexible standards, the Supreme Court has
limited the scope of the exclusionary rule 52 and returned to a case by case approach for evaluating police conduct. 53 In so doing, the Court may be attempting to remedy the irritating irony created by the exclusionary rule, namely
"where there have been two wrongs, the defendant's and the officer's, both will
go free."5 4 Thus, not only the emphasis, but also the approach to protecting an
accused's constitutional rights has changed.
The ultimate significance of the principal case lies in the erosion of an
accused's right to counsel, which the Miranda court called "indispensable to
the protection of the Fifth amendment privilege ... ,,.5 It has been suggested
by a participant-observer of police procedure, that the police tend to continue
every "questionable practice" not expressly forbidden by the courts.56 If so, the
practical consequences of the Court's failure to denounce the unethical conduct
of the Oregon police may be substantial. The case additionally suggests that
the exclusionary rule will be limited so as not to impair a court's search for the
truth. It is distressing, however, that these limitations on the exclusionary rule
will be imposed before alternative means57 of protecting the defendant's constitutional rights are developed. 58
JAMES G. PAULSEN

49. See Gangi, supra note 9, at 1103.
50. Id. at 1088-95.

51. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
52. The Court may have been willing to limit the exclusionary rule because of the
dearth of evidence that this rule actually influences police behavior. Criticism of the rule has
been increasing. See LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MIcii. L. REv. 987 (1965); Oaks, Studying
the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cr. L. Rmv. 665 (1970); Wingo, Growing
Disillusionment with the Exclusionary Rule, 25 Sw. LJ. 573 (1971); Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the ConstableBlunders?, 50 TExAs L. REv. 736 (1972).

53. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
54. Oaks, supra note 52, at 755.
55. 384 U.S. at 469.
56.

J. SKOLNICK, JusTicE WrrHouv

TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMFTr IN DEMOCRATiC Socirry 224

(1966).
57. One alternative to the exclusionary rule is the creation of a tort cause of action for
damages to the victim of an illegal search and seizure, which would be brought before an administrative or quasi-judicial agency. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403
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